Risk assessment for the implementation of controlled human Schistosoma mansoni infection trials in Uganda by Koopman, Jan Pieter et al.
OPEN LETTER
Risk assessment for the implementation of controlled human 
Schistosoma mansoni infection trials in Uganda [version 1; peer 
review: 1 approved, 1 approved with reservations]
Jan Pieter Koopman 1, Moses Egesa 2, Anne Wajja3, Moses Adriko 4, 
Jacent Nassuuna3, Gyaviira Nkurunungi 3, Emmanuella Driciru 3, 
Gijsbert van Willigen5, Stephen Cose 3,6, Maria Yazdanbakhsh1, 
Pontiano Kaleebu3, Narcis Kabatereine4, Edridah Tukahebwa4, 
Meta Roestenberg 1*, Alison M. Elliott 3,6*
1Department of Parasitology, Leiden University Medical Center, Leiden, The Netherlands 
2Uganda Virus Research Institute, Entebbe, Uganda 
3Medical Research Council/Uganda Virus Research Institute and London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Uganda Research 
Unit, Entebbe, Uganda 
4Vector Control Division, Ministry of Health of Uganda, Kampala, Uganda 
5Department of Health, Safety and the Environment, Leiden University Medical Center, Leiden, The Netherlands 
6Clinical Research Department, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, UK 
* Equal contributors
First published: 03 Jun 2019, 2:17  
https://doi.org/10.12688/aasopenres.12972.1





Schistosomiasis is a parasitic infection highly prevalent in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and a significant cause of morbidity; it is a priority for vaccine 
development. A controlled human infection model for Schistosoma 
mansoni (CHI-S) with potential to accelerate vaccine development has 
been developed among naïve volunteers in the Netherlands. Because 
responses both to infections and candidate vaccines are likely to differ 
between endemic and non-endemic settings, we propose to establish 
a CHI-S in Uganda where Schistosoma mansoni is endemic. As part of a 
“road-map” to this goal, we have undertaken a risk assessment. We 
identified risks related to importing of laboratory vector snails and 
schistosome strains from the Netherlands to Uganda; exposure to 
natural infection in endemic settings concurrently with CHI-S studies, 
and unfamiliarity of the community with the nature, risks and 
rationale for CHI. Mitigating strategies are proposed. With careful 
implementation of the latter, we believe that CHI-S can be 
implemented safely in Uganda. Our reflections are presented here to 
promote feedback and discussion.
Open Peer Review







03 Jun 2019 report report
James E. Meiring , Malawi-Liverpool 
Wellcome Trust Clinical Research 
Programme, Blantyre, Malawi 
Oxford University, Oxford, UK
1. 
Donald Harn, University of Georgia, Athens, 2. 
AAS Open Research
 
Page 1 of 18
AAS Open Research 2019, 2:17 Last updated: 18 FEB 2021
Corresponding author: Alison M. Elliott (alison.elliott@mrcuganda.org)
Author roles: Koopman JP: Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing – Original Draft Preparation, Writing – Review & Editing; Egesa M: 
Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing – Original Draft Preparation, Writing – Review & Editing; Wajja A: Validation, Writing – Review & 
Editing; Adriko M: Validation, Writing – Review & Editing; Nassuuna J: Validation, Writing – Review & Editing; Nkurunungi G: Validation, 
Writing – Review & Editing; Driciru E: Validation, Writing – Review & Editing; van Willigen G: Validation, Writing – Original Draft 
Preparation, Writing – Review & Editing; Cose S: Validation, Writing – Review & Editing; Yazdanbakhsh M: Validation, Writing – Review & 
Editing; Kaleebu P: Validation, Writing – Review & Editing; Kabatereine N: Validation, Writing – Review & Editing; Tukahebwa E: 
Validation, Writing – Review & Editing; Roestenberg M: Conceptualization, Funding Acquisition, Methodology, Validation, Writing – 
Original Draft Preparation, Writing – Review & Editing; Elliott AM: Conceptualization, Funding Acquisition, Methodology, Writing – 
Original Draft Preparation, Writing – Review & Editing
Competing interests: The authors have declared no personal financial competing interests. However, we are working collaboratively to 
develop the CHI-S for implementation in Uganda, and therefore have research goals with potential to influence our approach to this risk 
assessment. This is, in part, our motivation for publishing it on an open peer review platform.
Grant information: The work was supported by a pump-priming grant from the HIV-Vac network. The HIC-Vac network is supported by 
the GCRF Networks in Vaccines Research & Development, which is co-funded by the Medical Research Council (MRC) and the 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC). This UK funded award is part of the EDCTP2 programme supported by 
the European Union. AME is a fellow of the African Academy of Sciences. 
The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Copyright: © 2019 Koopman JP et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
How to cite this article: Koopman JP, Egesa M, Wajja A et al. Risk assessment for the implementation of controlled human 
Schistosoma mansoni infection trials in Uganda [version 1; peer review: 1 approved, 1 approved with reservations] AAS Open 
Research 2019, 2:17 https://doi.org/10.12688/aasopenres.12972.1
First published: 03 Jun 2019, 2:17 https://doi.org/10.12688/aasopenres.12972.1 
Keywords 
Schistosoma mansoni, Controlled Human Infection Studies, Uganda, 
risk assessment
 
This article is included in the MUII-plus 
gateway.
USA
Any reports and responses or comments on the 
article can be found at the end of the article.
AAS Open Research
 
Page 2 of 18
AAS Open Research 2019, 2:17 Last updated: 18 FEB 2021
Background
Schistosomiasis is a parasitic infection affecting approximately 
230 million people worldwide1. Infection is caused by trema-
todes (flukes) of the genus Schistosoma. Because the infec-
tion is responsible for considerable morbidity worldwide, 
particularly in Africa, schistosomiasis was recently listed among 
the top 10 infections for which a vaccine should urgently be 
developed2.
Controlled human infection (CHI) studies are an important tool 
for vaccine development. They provide a platform to safely and 
swiftly test vaccine candidates for the pathogen in question. Fur-
thermore, they can contribute to understanding host-pathogen 
interactions and help to unravel the nature of protective immu-
nity. They have been used successfully for a substantial number 
of infectious diseases, including malaria, dengue, and influenza3. 
A CHI model has now been developed for schistosomiasis at 
Leiden University Medical Center, where Dutch volunteers 
with no previous exposure to schistosomiasis participated3. 
However, the response to schistosome infection, and to candi-
date vaccines, is likely to be different in endemic countries. In 
such settings multiple differences in environmental exposures, as 
well as prior exposure to schistosomes, drive differences in both 
the innate and adaptive immune responses which determine 
infection susceptibility and vaccine responses4,5.
We are therefore working towards the establishment of a control-
led human infection model for schistosomiasis in Uganda, where 
Schistosoma mansoni is highly endemic. Almost 30% of the 
population is estimated to be infected6, with half the population 
at risk7. As a first step we held a stakeholders’ meeting in 
Uganda in November 2017, and we published the meeting report 
and resultant road-map for the implementation process8. A key 
element of the road-map was to undertake a risk assessment. 
This document therefore aims to provide an assessment of risks 
that may arise before, during and after start of a controlled human 
infection model with Schistosoma mansoni (CHI-S) in Uganda.
Male and female schistosomes live in the mesenteric or perivesi-
cal veins of their human host, where they mate and produce eggs. 
These eggs are either released into the environment through fae-
ces and urine or stay within the host tissue where they induce 
inflammation. When the excreted eggs reach fresh water, they 
hatch and release miracidia that can then infect a suitable snail 
host. Infected snails are able to shed larvae, called cercariae, 
which infect humans. The Leiden University Medical Center 
(LUMC) CHI-S exposed healthy naïve volunteers to increasing 
doses of male cercariae to study the tolerability of such a con-
trolled human infection model. This male-only model avoids the 
risk of pathology caused by schistosome eggs. To generate the 
infectious cercariae for a male-only CHI-S, individual laboratory- 
reared freshwater snails are infected, each with a single mira-
cidium. Clonal replication follows, such that thousands of 
single-sex cercariae are subsequently shed by the snail. The 
sex of the cercariae can be determined by PCR, and the appro-
priate number of cercariae can be prepared for dermal infec-
tion. Because snails shed thousands of cercariae over a period of 
weeks, every time they are exposed to light, it is possible to 
first perform quality control (QC) testing on every batch (e.g. 
to assess the viability, sex and bioburden of the cercariae). Fol-
lowing principles set forward in good manufacturing practices 
(GMP) guidelines, the cercariae and their excipients are produced 
and tested for consistent quality according to predefined 
criteria. Only when compliant, is the cercariae batch released 
for clinical use. To this date, 17 people have been exposed to 
S. mansoni cercariae during CHI-S studies in Leiden.
In terms of the technical aspects of shipping infectious mate-
rial to Uganda, culturing the infectious material in Uganda and 
preparing the infectious cercariae, we have considered three 
options. 
Option 1: Shipping of parasites and snails from the Netherlands 
to Uganda. In this scenario, S. mansoni parasites and snails 
would be shipped from Leiden (The Netherlands) for preparation 
of the cercariae for human infection in Uganda. From a techni-
cal perspective, the easiest approach to rapid implementation 
of CHI-S in Uganda would be to produce and release the infec-
tious snails in Leiden and subsequently ship them to Uganda. 
In Uganda, a further snail shedding would be used to generate 
the infectious cercariae. Alternatively, S. mansoni parasites 
(for example in the form of S. mansoni eggs contained in a 
rodent liver) could be shipped separately from uninfected snails, 
which would mitigate shipment risks.
The CHI-S model in Leiden uses a schistosome strain which 
has been genotyped and has been mapped to be of Puerto Rican 
origin3. Because this strain has been laboratory adapted and 
kept in the Leiden facility since 1955, it has the advantage of its 
known virulence in animals, experience of its effects in the Dutch 
human volunteers, and its sensitivity to praziquantel. As well, 
the Leiden model uses Biomphalaria glabrata snails which are 
not indigenous to Uganda (Appendix 1 [Extended data9]). There-
fore, the ecological risks of accidental release of schistosomes 
or snails or into the environment have to be considered.
Option 2: Shipping of parasites from The Netherlands 
followed by use of local Ugandan snails. This scenario would 
involve transporting only S. mansoni parasites (Puerto-Rican 
strain), then using local snail species such as B. choanomphala 
(from Lake Victoria) or B. stanleyi (from Lake Albert) to pro-
duce cercariae in Uganda10. Advantages, as in option 1, would 
be the fact that the parasite strain has been characterized in both 
animals and humans, which decreases its potential risk for the 
volunteers. Disadvantages would be possible technical hur-
dles to be overcome to establish a local snail colony and achieve 
successful infection with release of infectious S. mansoni 
cercariae. However, expertise in these processes already exists in 
Uganda10, subject to laboratory renovations and staff training to 
ensure compliance with GMP principles. This option would also 
be relatively simple to implement.
Option 3: Using local Ugandan parasites and local Ugandan 
snails. In this scenario the full S. mansoni laboratory life 
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cycle would be established in Uganda, using a local snail species 
and starting with a new S. mansoni strain, and a rodent mamma-
lian host. Although the risk of clinically unexpected, unwanted 
side effects, or of relative resistance to praziquantel treatment, 
might be higher when using the local strain of S. mansoni, 
the ecological risk would be lowest.
All options require preparation of the cercariae for human infec-
tion under strict Quality Assurance and controlled conditions 
in Uganda with adherence to Good Manufacturing Guidelines. 
In Leiden, procedures were developed based on GMP principles 
contained in the European Commission directive 2003/94/ EC, 
with the infectious cercariae considered as an “auxiliary medici-
nal product”. Details of the procedures have been published3. 
These include production in a biosafety level 3 facility, governed 
by stringent standard operating procedures including for qual-
ity control, logging and monitoring; production and counting 
of infectious cercariae by two independent technologists; and 
antibiotic treatment and microbiological bioburden testing to 
ensure that the cercarial product is free of pathogens with poten-
tial to harm CHI volunteers. Equivalent procedures and quality 
control will be needed in Uganda in order to implement CHI-S.
In this document we address risks associated with CHI-S in 
Uganda on three different levels: i) the introduction of new 
species (the transport of snails, the snail culture facilities, the 
potential for ecological harm as a result of importing snails), 
ii) the introduction of a new schistosome strain into Uganda, and 
iii) clinical trial risks common to all options (natural infection 
during the trial period, and the risks to volunteers resulting from 
the controlled infection).
Risk assessment methods
We identified risks and potential approaches to mitigation based 
on relevant literature, experience from the Leiden CHI-S model, 
stakeholder discussions, and discussion with experts. The level 
of risk and effectiveness of proposed controls was determined 
by consensus between the authors. The inherent risk was 
defined as the risk before putting controls in place, calculated 
as the product of the likelihood and impact scores. The residual 
risk was similarly calculated, based on likelihood and impact 
scores after controls have been put in place. Mitigating 
controls could reduce the residual risk score by reducing the 
likelihood of an event occurring, or by reducing the impact if it 
should occur. Likelihood was scored as almost certain/common, 
5; likely, 4; possible, 3; unlikely, 2; rare, 1. Impact was scored 
as critical, 5; major, 4; moderate, 3; minor, 2; insignificant 1. 
Resulting risk scores of 18–25 were considered high, and 
unacceptable. Resulting risk scores in the range of 9–17 were 
considered moderate, with further controls desirable if possible, 
and caution required if implemented at this risk level. Resulting 
scores of 0–8 were considered low, and usually acceptable.
Option 1: Shipping of parasites and snails from the 
Netherlands to Uganda
According to our first idea, infected snails would be shipped. 
The WHO report ‘Guidance on regulations for the Transport of 
Infectious Substances 2017–2018’11 provides information on 
how to adequately transport infectious substances. In accordance 
with these guidelines, shipment of S. mansoni infected snails 
falls under ‘CATEGORY B, INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCES’ 
(UN3373). Shipment of live snails is a time-sensitive undertak-
ing and therefore can only be facilitated by air shipment. Infec-
tious substances cannot be carried on as hand-luggage. Transport 
of infectious substances are subjected to International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) requirements. Packaging of 
Category B substances need to comply with rules set out in the 
P650 packaging instruction11. This involves triple packag-
ing and proper marking and documentation. Upon arrival in 
Uganda, it would be crucial for the package to clear customs 
as quickly as possible so that snails arrive in good condition. In 
order to achieve this, the customs office should be notified about 
the arrival of the shipment. In collaboration with the customs 
officer, all required documentation should be prepared in 
advance and approval for import of the products should be sought.
Alternatively, snails and Schistosoma parasites would be 
shipped separately. Uninfected snails can be shipped more easily 
because this shipment does not have to comply with the regula-
tions for the transport of infectious substances. Similar to the 
previous option, shipment should clear customs as soon as pos-
sible. These snails could be kept to reproduce in the Ugandan 
laboratory to sustain their life cycle.
A second shipment would contain Schistosoma parasites. There 
are two ways in which this material can be transported (still under 
the ‘CATEGORY B, INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCES’ (UN3373)):
1) Within a living host such as a Schistosoma-infected ham-
ster. These animals can shed Schistosoma eggs that can be used 
to infect the snails.
2) Within a preserved liver sample kept on medium from a 
Schistosoma-infected hamster. This liver sample contains 
Schistosoma eggs. Upon arrival in Uganda, further processing 
of the sample provides miracidia which can be used to infect 
the snails. Test shipments should be scheduled to determine the 
feasibility of such transports and the conditions in which the 
liver sample should be shipped. From previous experiments in 
Leiden, the preserved liver sample can be used to infect snails for 
up to one week after being harvested.
Risks associated with shipping of parasites and snails from the 
Netherlands to Uganda, and mitigating strategies, are summarized 
in Table 1.
Option 1: snail culture facilities; potential ecological 
harm
To house the Biomphalaria glabrata snails in Uganda, they 
would need to be kept in strict quarantine. B. glabrata are not 
a naturally occurring snail host in Uganda, and should there-
fore not spread to the environment. In order to house snails, an 
incubator, or room temperature, set and monitored at 28˚C is 
needed. The incubator (if used) door should be fully closed when 
the laboratory is not in use. Precautionary measures to contain 
the snails to the facility should be taken and include physical 
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barriers, such as rooms with closed doors and windows. The 
snail culture basins and water drainage system should be 
covered with fine mesh to prevent escape (appendix 1 [Extended 
data9]). In addition, access to the laboratory should controlled 
and restricted to the research team. The incubator (if used) should 
preferably be positioned away from the door. Additional security 
measures could be a double door to create a sluice. Appendix 2 
(Extended data9) lists precautionary measures that should to 
be taken when working with schistosomes. Standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) will be exchanged with LUMC and reviewed 
to fit the Ugandan facility. These SOPs deal with culture processes 
as well as the disposal of infectious material.
In case a single snail would accidentally be released into the 
environment, it is capable of reproducing in the absence of an 
opposite-sex snail using self-insemination12. This ability poses 
an ecological hazard where a single snail could develop into a 
colony. In addition, snails can be transported over large distances 
attached to birds and can survive dry conditions for up to two 
months. This snail itself is not endemic in Uganda, although 
previously this species has been held at the Vector Control 
Division of the Ministry of Health for a different project. The 
consequences of accidental introduction of this new species 
are difficult to predict, however it may result in the following 
(Appendix 1 [Extended data9]):
1)    Interspecific hybridization between B. glabrata and local 
Biomphalaria species
2)    Uncontrolled spread due to lack of natural enemies, 
competitors or pathogens
3)    Altered S. mansoni dynamics, because of potentially higher 
susceptibility of B. glabrata for S. mansoni infection
Spread to the environment of B. glabrata may go unnoticed, 
because of its similar morphology to endemic snail species.
Risks associated with culture of B. glabrata in Uganda, and 
mitigating strategies, are summarised in Table 2.
Option 2: transport of S. mansoni infectious 
material and use of local snail species for cercarial 
production
This approach only requires transport of S. mansoni infec-
tious material. This would use the second transport approach 
described in option 1, within a preserved liver sample from a 
schistosomiasis-infected hamster. The same regulatory guidelines 
for transporting infectious material apply. A major advantage 
of this approach is that the potential ecological and genetic risks 
related to introduction of a non-endemic snail species can be 
avoided.
Option 3: re-establishing the full S. mansoni 
laboratory life cycle in Uganda, using a local snail 
species and S. mansoni strain
The alternative to shipping infectious material and snails from 
The Netherlands is to re-establish the full laboratory life cycle 
of S. mansoni using Ugandan snail species and Ugandan isolates 
of S. mansoni. The life-cycle has been maintained in the past at 
the Vector Control Division of the Ministry of Health, but is not 
currently available. The advantages of using a Ugandan life 
cycle include reducing the environmental risk associated with 
non-endemic snail species and schistosome strains. In addition, 
this model would be most representative of the field infections 
in Uganda. There are however several challenges with using 
Ugandan snails and isolates. With regard to Ugandan snail 
species, there is variability between snail species in suscep-
tibility to S. mansoni infection; however, there is experience 
of conducting infection of local species at the Vector Control 
Division10, so this is expected to be feasible. With regard to the 
new schistosome laboratory strain, the characteristics of this 
would be unknown in terms of virulence and susceptibility 
to praziquantel treatment. Determining these characteristics 
would not be simple, since validated tests for schistosome 
Table 1. Risks associated with shipping of Schistosoma mansoni parasites and Biomphalaria glabrata snails.
Risk Inherent risk score Total 
inherent risk
Controls Residual risk score Total risk 
post control
Likelihood Impact Likelihood Impact
Death of snails in 
transport
Likely Critical 25 Pilot transport with low numbers 
of snails to optimize transport 
conditions
Possible Critical 15
Delays in customs 
clearance
Likely Major 16 Contacting customs 
officials to discuss required 
documentations and preparing 
documents prior to shipment
Possible Major 12
Spill of infectious 
materials and non-
indigenous snail species
Possible Major 12 Proper packaging Unlikely Moderate 6
Establishment of a  
B. glabrata colony 
outside laboratory facility
Possible Critical 15 Proper packaging Rare Critical 5
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resistance are currently not available. In addition, the new 
isolate would not be clonal and variability within the newly col-
lected schistosome population might result in variable responses 
in the host, and to drug treatment. In addition, dose-finding 
studies would start from scratch to find the balance between 
tolerability and attack rate.
Options 1, 2 and 3 all require the establishment of facilities in 
Uganda for production of the infectious cercariae under GMP 
principles, in order to ensure high quality, reproducible infec-
tious doses. Option 3 requires also the establishment of suitable, 
specific pathogen free animal facilities to house the rodents 
(hamsters or mice) that will provide the mammalian hosts in 
the laboratory life cycle. Risks associated with these elements 
are also considered here (Table 3).
Natural infection during trial period
The single-sex S. mansoni challenge has been designed to pre-
vent the occurrence of egg-associated morbidity. In the cur-
rent model, volunteers participating in the trial will be infected 
using only male cercariae which penetrate the skin and result 
in potent infection. In future, female cercariae may also be 
used to infect volunteers. The sex of the male cercariae can be 
determined using a specifically designed multiplex real-time 
PCR which has been described elsewhere3. Once infected, indi-
viduals should avoid any exposure to contaminated water. If a 
subject were to be naturally infected over the course of the 
study, this might lead to mixed, male and female, infections, 
with mating of the schistosomes resulting in egg production that 
causes morbidity. If the Puerto Rican strain used in Leiden is 
imported for use in Uganda, mating and excretion of eggs into 
the environment could alter the genetic make-up of Ugandan 
schistosome populations, with unknown consequences. How-
ever, given that the Puerto-Rican strain is relatively inbred 
after prolonged passage in the laboratory, and was shown to be 
praziquantel-sensitive in the CHI-S, hybridisation with Ugandan 
schistosome populations is unlikely to result in increased 
praziquantel resistance or virulence.
The chance of natural infection can be limited by choosing a 
study population which does not come into contact with fresh-
water. However, this would over-restrict recruitment from the 
true target population, which is people at risk of S. mansoni 
infection. Options to minimise this risk among volunteers from 
the preferred target population include the following:
1)    The feasibility of avoiding fresh water may be sur-
veyed using questionnaires in a pilot study at the field 
site and the information used to select volunteers 
least at risk of re-exposure, and to make provisions to 
support volunteers to avoid re-exposure.
2)    While selecting subjects, the investigator may ask whether 
the subject is likely to spend time in, or to travel to, 
areas where the risk of contracting a natural infection is 
high. If so, once again it should be stressed that contact 
with fresh water should be avoided; volunteers unlikely 
to achieve this would be excluded.
3)    Apart from providing information to the volunteer and 
raising awareness of this issue, frequent testing for eggs 
in stool and urine samples may be performed by micro-
scopy (and PCR). Eggs can be found 5–7 weeks after 
mixed male and female infection1. S. mansoni eggs in stool 
would indicate a concomitant natural infection, which 
would necessitate immediate treatment of the volunteer 
with praziquantel. However, stool microscopy and PCR 
is likely to be unreliable given variable egg excretion 
and the low sensitivity of stool examination for eggs13.
4)    In those trials in which natural infection may be a con-
siderable risk, testing using plasma circulating anodic 
antigen (CAA) may be conducted weekly from the 
outset of the trial. Both natural and experimental infec-
tions may then be terminated as soon as patent infection 
has been detected (e.g. at ~7 weeks post controlled 
human infection, when CAA levels > 1pg/mL). Early 
abrogation of the infection will prevent mating and egg 
Table 2. Risks associated with snail culture facilities.
Risk Inherent risk score Total 
inherent risk
Controls Residual risk score Total risk 
post control
Likelihood Impact Likelihood Impact
Spread of Biomphalaria 
glabrata snail to environment
Possible Critical 15 1)   Precautionary measures 
for snail housing facility 
including physical barriers 
and restricted access
2)   Use of SOPs regarding 




Establishment of a B. glabrata 
colony outside laboratory 
facility
Possible Critical 15 1)   Development of 
containment strategies
Rare Critical 5
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laying. There would be modest drawbacks to the result-
ing data, because it would not be possible to study the 
dynamics of antigen excretion over time and quantitation 
of infection would be less accurate.
5)    Alternatively, volunteers may be displaced to a non-endemic 
region for the study duration. However, the prolonged, 
seven to 12-week “admission” required for the CHI-S 
would be a major burden and inconvenience, as opposed 
to the relatively short-duration (24 days) for malaria 
CHI studies where such approach has been employed14. 
The possibility of volunteers absconding during the study, 
given the long duration, might be significant, abrogating 
the value of such an approach. Additionally, this would 
have cost implications, in terms of providing suitable 
accommodation and compensation for loss of income.
Risks associated with natural infection during the CHI-S, and 
mitigating strategies, are summarised in Table 4.
Risks to volunteers resulting from the controlled 
human infection
Controlled infection with S. mansoni has been successfully 
performed in 17 Dutch volunteers. Although the single sex infec-
tion does not cause egg-related morbidity in volunteers, it may 
cause symptoms in response to the infection. These include der-
matitis due to the percutaneous penetration of the cercariae and 
an acute schistosomiasis as a consequence of a systemic hyper-
sensitivity response15. Severe acute schistosomiasis syndrome 
(Katayama fever) may present with symptoms such as fever, 
fatigue, myalgia, malaise, non-productive cough, eosinophilia 
and patchy infiltrates on chest radiography. In Leiden, several 
volunteers reported with systemic symptoms which seemed to be 
an acute schistosomiasis syndrome, with one volunteer present-
ing with prolonged symptoms of Katayama fever15. In addition, 
one volunteer presented with peri-orbital oedema which lasted 
one day, and may have been related to the infection15. Such 
symptoms can be treated symptomatically and all recovered. 
Both these volunteers had received the highest dose of cercariae 
(30 cercariae) used in Leiden. The risk of severe symptoms 
can be minimised by dose escalation in modest increments. 
The impact can be reduced by careful monitoring, provision 
of symptomatic relief and abrogation of infection by treat-
ment if necessary. Frequent follow up visits need to be sched-
uled throughout the trial to discuss adverse events and conduct 
clinical assessments of the study volunteers. Safety laboratory 
tests need to be routinely performed. Volunteers can also 
experience side effects related to the praziquantel treatment. Com-
mon side effects include nausea, dizziness, and fatigue. Volunteers 
can be reassured that these symptoms are well recognised and 
transient. Their severity can be reduced by taking praziquantel 
after food. Symptomatic relief can be provided when required.
The 2017 stakeholders’ meeting identified community engage-
ment to ensure proper understanding of the CHI-S as an essen-
tial basis for ethical conduct of a CHI study. CHI is a novel 
concept in Uganda, where CHI have not been undertaken in the 
past and understanding of medical research, in general, is at a 
low level. The idea of a “medical” procedure being undertaken 
which is expected to cause symptoms, and undertaken for the 
greater, rather than an individual, good needs careful explanation. 
Rumours and misunderstandings have the potential to criti-
cally affect the work, and to have an adverse effect also on other 
institutional research activities. Engagement with national and 
community leaders, work with community advisory boards 
who can identify, and help to address, misinformation; effective 
education of volunteers to a full understanding of the expected 
effects of the CHI (and reasons for undertaking it) will all be 
essential to the smooth and safe running of these projects.
Risks related to volunteers and communities during the CHI-S, 
and mitigating strategies, are summarised in Table 5.
Table 3. Risks associated with re-establishing Uganda Schistosoma mansoni life cycle.
Risk Inherent risk score Total 
inherent 
risk
Controls Residual risk score Total 
risk post 
controlLikelihood Impact Likelihood Impact
New isolates of S. mansoni 
from the Ugandan population 
might exhibit variable 
praziquantel susceptibility, or 
praziquantel resistance
Possible Critical 15 1)   Test new isolates for praziquantel 
susceptibility in vitro and in an 
animal model before use in CHI
Unlikely Critical 10
New isolates of S. mansoni 
from the Ugandan population 
might exhibit unexpected 
virulence
Possible Critical 15 1)   Test new isolates for relative 
virulence in an animal model 
before use in CHI
Unlikely Critical 10
Production processes based 
on GMP principles for single-
sex infectious cercariae not 
established in Uganda
Possible Critical 15 1)   Development of appropriate 
animal and snail facilities
2)   Training of Ugandan staff
3)   Monitoring and review by 
experienced LUMC collaborators
4)   Monitoring and review by 
Ugandan regulators
Rare Critical 5
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Table 5. Risks associated with controlled human infection with Schistosoma mansoni.
Risk Inherent risk score Total 
inherent 
risk
Controls Residual risk score Total 
risk post 
controlLikelihood Impact Likelihood Impact
Symptoms related 
to infection
Common Major 20 1)   Slow dose escalation in modest 
increments
2)   Frequent follow up visits and collection of 
adverse events.
3)   Clinical assessment and routine safety 
lab.
4)   Symptomatic treatment with 
corticosteroids or abrogating infection 
with praziquantel (which kills adult 
worms) if needed.




to treatment with 
praziquantel
Common Moderate 15 1)   Take praziquantel with food
2)   Clinical assessment, reassurance, 
symptomatic relief if needed
Common Minor 10
Misunderstanding 
of the nature of 
CHI-S studies
Likely Critical 20 1)   Education of community leaders, opinion 
makers and regulators
2)   Work with community advisory board
3)   Education of potential volunteers using 
tested materials
4)   Informed consent verified with tests of 
comprehension
Possible Major 12
Table 4. Risks associated with natural infection during trial period.
Risk Inherent risk score Total 
inherent 
risk
Controls Residual risk score Total 
risk post 





Likely Moderate* 12 1)   Avoidance of fresh water bodies during trial 
period
2)   Pilot survey to establish feasibility of fresh 
water avoidance
3)   Selection of trial volunteers with low risk of 
contracting natural infection
4)   Abrogation of infection as soon as the trial 
endpoint has been reached (e.g. CAA> 1 pg/mL)
5)   Displacement of volunteers to non-endemic 












Likely Moderate 12 1)   Full clearance of infections before trial starts
2)   Continuous screening for egg production
3)   Abrogation of infection as soon as the trial 
endpoint has been reached (e.g. CAA> 1 pg/mL)
4)   Displacement of volunteers to non-endemic 
setting with excellent water and sanitation 
facilities.
Rare Moderate 3
* The impact of natural co-infection on morbidity is classed as moderate (rather than major or critical) since volunteers who acquire such an infection would 
presumably be at risk of mixed-sex natural infections as a result of their usual behaviours and occupation. The risk of egg-related morbidity due to the 
presence of male worms from the CHI-S would therefore add little to the risk resulting from exposure to natural infection. CAA - circulating anodic antigen
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Discussion
In this document we have reflected on the potential risks involved 
in establishing a controlled human infection model for schis-
tosomiasis in Uganda. The opinions expressed and risk scores 
allocated have been arrived at by discussion between the authors 
and are therefore subjective. In submitting this document to 
open peer review through the African Academy of Sciences 
Open Research Platform we welcome discussion of these issues.
Based on the assessments made, our own reflections and 
proposed plans are as follows.
First, we have decided not to pursue the option of importing 
B. glabrata snails from the Netherlands to Uganda. Although 
the proposed controls were estimated to reduce the risk or 
establishing a colony outside the laboratory to low, it seems unnec-
essary to incur them. Since snail species endemic to Uganda 
are susceptible to S. mansoni infection we expect that option 
2 will work. 
Second, we propose to further pursue the option of using the 
Puerto Rican laboratory strain of S. mansoni in the CHI-S in 
Uganda. We consider that the recognised virulence and prazi-
quantel susceptibility profile of this strain makes it a safe option 
for CHI-S. The long-term in-breeding of the laboratory strain is 
an asset in this regard, making the characteristics of each clone of 
male cercariae reasonably predictable. The potential variability 
of a newly isolated schistosome population from Uganda would 
be a concern – even if generally of modest virulence and good 
praziquantel susceptibility, an individual clone might exhibit 
undesirable properties.
To generate infectious cercariae for human infection and chal-
lenge studies following the principles of GMP it will be essen-
tial to establish a suitably controlled snail facility in Uganda. For 
sustainability (to avoid the need of repeated shipping of infec-
tious material from the Netherlands) it will also be necessary 
to establish a specific pathogen free animal facility to house the 
mammalian host and complete the laboratory life cycle.
With regard to the selection of volunteers, and avoidance of 
natural infection during the CHI-S, current activities include 
engagement with relevant Ugandan communities which are 
potential settings for recruitment of volunteers. As part of the 
engagement, options for avoidance are being explored. Our current 
view is that careful volunteer selection, close follow up and 
immediate abrogation of infection (on detection of CAA) will 
be preferable to 12-week “admissions”; but views from the 
communities will influence our future approach.
Controlled human infections with known pathogens inevitably 
involve risks and possibly the burden of symptoms. Available 
mitigations in several examples reduced our risk scores only to 
moderate, rather than low: for example, symptomatic treatment 
and early abrogation of infection cannot reduce the likelihood 
of symptoms below common, but can reduce the impact of the 
symptoms. Such areas emphasise the need for caution – for 
example, small group sizes and carefully monitored dose-escalation 
approaches.
We realize that symptoms may be different among Ugandan 
volunteers than among Dutch volunteers. Particularly, Katayama 
fever is considered less likely to occur in subjects from endemic, 
compared to subjects from non-endemic settings1. Nevertheless, 
we shall provide full information to potential volunteers about 
symptoms predicted from the literature, and those which occurred 
previously in the Dutch volunteers. We are currently piloting 
educational materials, volunteer information sheets, and tests 
of comprehension in order to ensure that Ugandan volunteers 
can be enrolled with genuine understanding and fully informed 
consent. As well, we shall work with community leaders 
and advisors to ensure optimal understanding of the work, and 
to mitigate the impact of rumours about the work which are 
likely to arise.
We conclude that, with careful risk management, CHI-S can 
be safely implemented in Uganda with a view to accelerating 




No data are associated with this article.
Extended data
Open Science Framework: Controlled Human Infection Model 
– Schistosomiasis. https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/53GT99
This project contains the following extended data:
•    Appendix 1.docx (risk assessment report addressing the 
intended transfer to and culturing of the snail Biomphalaria 
glabrata in Uganda)
•    Appendix 2.docx (Summary of safety precautions for 
working with Schistosoma)
Data are available under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Zero “No rights reserved” data waiver (CC0 1.0 Public domain 
dedication).
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Donald Harn  
Department of Infectious Diseases, College of Veterinary Medicine, Center for Tropical and 
Emerging Global Diseases, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA 
Overall, the authors have put together 3 different scenarios that would eventually provide for 
controlled human infections with male schistosomes in Uganda. The authors present good 
rationale for why such CHI may be valuable for vaccine trials, and I generally agree with their 
rationale.  
  
The authors produced a document that attempts to summarize the risks associated with each 
scenario and how they would be reduced if proper interventions were imposed. Overall, a nicely 
written paper that concludes that “Option 2” introducing the Puerto Rican strain of Schistosoma 
mansoniinto Ugandan labs, and possibly the ecology, is the best way forward. I disagree with this 
assessment as outlined here and feel that the more costly (initially) “Option 3” is the best way 
forward to minimize unknown potential ecological risks.  
  
A few things concern me. One, the authors state “The level of risk and effectiveness of proposed 
controls was determined by consensus between the authors.” Some of these authors were 
involved in establishing CHI in Dutch volunteers in Leiden. However, I am concerned with the level 
of expertise the authors have in ecology or ecologic modeling to accurately assess the likelihood 
of introduction of new parasite or snail into the environment, and the impact of such new species 
into the Ugandan environment? 
  
For Option 3 the authors state“There are however several challenges with using Ugandan snails 
and isolates. With regard to Ugandan snail species, there is variability between snail species in 
susceptibility to S. mansoni infection;”  Wouldn’t this concern be the same for option 2.? 
  
Also under Option 3, the authors state “With regard to the new schistosome laboratory strain, the 
characteristics of this would be unknown in terms of virulence and susceptibility to praziquantel 
treatment. Determining these characteristics would not be simple, since validated tests for 
schistosome resistance are currently not available. In addition, the new isolate would not be clonal 
and variability within the newly collected schistosome population might result in variable 
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responses in the host, and to drug treatment. In addition, dose-finding studies would start from 
scratch to find the balance between tolerability and attack rate.” 
  
I find all of these arguments not justifiable. Determining susceptibility to PZQ in their animal 
model is straightforward and they can do this. They can easily produce a clone or clones of 
schistosomes to initiate these studies. Yes, infectious dose studies will have to start from scratch, 
but in reality, as this is an endemic population, not Dutch volunteers, this will have to be done with 
Ugandans anyway. 
  
In the “Natural Infection during trial period” the authors note that at some point they may 
introduce female cercariae infections. Are they implying single-sex female cercariae infections? 
Later in this section the authors note that infected individuals should avoid any contact with 
schistosome contaminated water. How feasible is this? Much of the risk here will depend on the 
residence of the cohorts for the Ugandan CHI trials. If the volunteers are urban, with little to no 
chance of encountering contaminated water, this point is moot and perhaps the authors have 
considered this as a likely way to mitigate this potential problem. 
  
General, the Tables are informative. I may have missed this but, it is not clear to me how the 
authors determined the reduced “Total risk post control” score? We can see large swings in score 
from initial “Total inherent risk” to the score for “Total risk post control” but do not have a 
numerical rationale mentioned or discussed for why this lower score. 
  
Minor: 
Potent should be patent 
  
Hybridisation with local schistosome population unlikely to result in praziquantel resistance? 
Maybe true, but you still have created a hybrid parasite. 
  
Under “Option 1: snail culture facilities, potential ecological harm” page 5, first paragraph, line 4 
should be corrected to read “access to the laboratory should be controlled…”
 
Is the rationale for the Open Letter provided in sufficient detail?
Yes
Does the article adequately reference differing views and opinions?
Partly
Are all factual statements correct, and are statements and arguments made adequately 
supported by citations?
Partly
Is the Open Letter written in accessible language?
Yes
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Competing Interests: No competing interests were disclosed.
Reviewer Expertise: Vaccine design, development, and delivery. Field studies. Immunology. 
Tropical Medicine/Parasitology.
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of 
expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have 
significant reservations, as outlined above.
Author Response 05 Aug 2019
Alison Elliott, Medical Research Council/Uganda Virus Research Institute and London 
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Uganda Research Unit, Entebbe, Uganda 
We thank Dr Harn for his review.  Our response is as follows. 
  
Comment. The authors produced a document that attempts to summarize the risks 
associated with each scenario and how they would be reduced if proper interventions were 
imposed. Overall, a nicely written paper that concludes that “Option 2” introducing the 
Puerto Rican strain of Schistosoma mansoni into Ugandan labs, and possibly the ecology, is 
the best way forward. I disagree with this assessment as outlined here and feel that the 
more costly (initially) “Option 3” is the best way forward to minimize unknown potential 
ecological risks. 
  
Response. We agree that the choice between the safety concerns on the one hand and the 
ecological risk on the other, is a challenging one. We also understand from this comment 
that we have not been clear about why, on balance, we prefer option 2. We have extended 
the paragraph in the discussion on this decision to be more specific about why this is our 
current preference. 
  
Comment. A few things concern me. One, the authors state “The level of risk and 
effectiveness of proposed controls was determined by consensus between the authors.” 
Some of these authors were involved in establishing CHI in Dutch volunteers in Leiden. 
However, I am concerned with the level of expertise the authors have in ecology or ecologic 
modeling to accurately assess the likelihood of introduction of new parasite or snail into the 
environment, and the impact of such new species into the Ugandan environment? 
  
Response. We agree that we, the authors, have little experience in assessment of ecological 
risks. For these parts of the risk assessment, we therefore consulted relevant ecologists and 
geneticists including Dr A. J. de Winter (Naturalis Biodiversity Center, Leiden, The 
Netherlands) regarding the snails and Dr. M. Berriman (Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute, 
UK) regarding the parasite. To make this clear, we have better outlined the considerations. 
With his permission, we have added Dr. Berriman to the acknowledgements. 
  
Comment. For Option 3 the authors state “There are however several challenges with using 
Ugandan snails and isolates. With regard to Ugandan snail species, there is variability 
between snail species in susceptibility to S. mansoni infection;”  Wouldn’t this concern be the 
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same for option 2.? 
  
Response. This is correct. We have adjusted accordingly and mention this concern for 
option 2 as well. 
  
Comment. Also under Option 3, the authors state “With regard to the new schistosome 
laboratory strain, the characteristics of this would be unknown in terms of virulence and 
susceptibility to praziquantel treatment. Determining these characteristics would not be 
simple, since validated tests for schistosome resistance are currently not available. In 
addition, the new isolate would not be clonal and variability within the newly collected 
schistosome population might result in variable responses in the host, and to drug 
treatment. In addition, dose-finding studies would start from scratch to find the balance 
between tolerability and attack rate.” 
  
I find all of these arguments not justifiable. Determining susceptibility to PZQ in their animal 
model is straightforward and they can do this. They can easily produce a clone or clones of 
schistosomes to initiate these studies. Yes, infectious dose studies will have to start from 
scratch, but in reality, as this is an endemic population, not Dutch volunteers, this will have 
to be done with Ugandans anyway. 
Response. We agree that an inbred population of Ugandan schistosomes could be 
established in a rodent model, but are not confident that it would be straightforward. Many 
generations of crossing following initial infection with a clone of males and a clone of 
females would be required to produce a monomorphic strain. Initiating the strain with a 
single clone of males and a single clone of females would minimise variability, but might 
also result in quite atypical parasites, not necessarily representative of the Ugandan 
population of schistosomes in general.  Starting with a more diverse selection of cercariae 
would generate a more representative laboratory population of Ugandan schistosomes, but 
would mean that the characteristics of any particular clone (notably pathogenicity or 
praziquantel resistance) selected for CHI-S would be unpredictable.   
  
Indeed our greatest concern is the potential for praziquantel resistance. Ugandan 
populations have been exposed to regular praziquantel treatment for over a decade, so 
there is a risk that the initial isolates would include individuals with relative praziquantel 
resistance1  which could not be established with certainty in the initial stages of the above 
process.  While we agree that some testing could be done in animals the pharmacokinetics 
and pharmacodynamics of praziquantel are complex and different between rodents and 
humans.2,3 
  
With regards to the dose-finding study, we agree that this would be the case for any of the 
three options and therefore removed this sentence. 
  
Comment. In the “Natural Infection during trial period” the authors note that at some point 
they may introduce female cercariae infections. Are they implying single-sex female 
cercariae infections? Later in this section the authors note that infected individuals should 
avoid any contact with schistosome contaminated water. How feasible is this? Much of the 
risk here will depend on the residence of the cohorts for the Ugandan CHI trials. If the 
volunteers are urban, with little to no chance of encountering contaminated water, this 
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point is moot and perhaps the authors have considered this as a likely way to mitigate this 
potential problem. 
  
Response. We have clarified the sentence on female cercariae – we indeed plan on 
developing a single-sex female model in the future. 
  
With regard to avoiding contact with contaminated water, the location we are considering 
to recruit volunteers for this work is a peri-urban fishing village close to Entebbe, well 
known to the research team, where many communal taps are available to provide an 
alternative water source. In addition, it will be possible to select volunteers who have access 
to adequate sanitation. We thus envision that it will be feasible to avoid any lake contact for 
these inhabitants. Through surveys and group discussions, we are currently assessing 
possible strategies to incentivise the use of tap water – for example, making it freely 
available for study participants. We hope that this will allow participation from the true 
target population i.e. people with previous exposure to Schistosoma mansoni. 
  
Comment. General, the Tables are informative. I may have missed this but, it is not clear to 
me how the authors determined the reduced “Total risk post control” score? We can see 
large swings in score from initial “Total inherent risk” to the score for “Total risk post 
control” but do not have a numerical rationale mentioned or discussed for why this lower 
score. 
  
Response. The inherent risk was defined as the risk before putting controls in place, 
calculated as the product of the likelihood and impact scores. The residual risk was similarly 
calculated, based on likelihood and impact scores after controls have been put in place. The 
difference in the calculated scores is based on the degree to which the proposed controls 
are expected to alter either the likelihood of the event happening, or the impact of the 
event, should it happen. We have added the scores to the legend of the tables for clarity. 
  
Comment. Potent should be patent 
  
Response. We have changed this. 
  
Comment. Hybridisation with local schistosome population unlikely to result in praziquantel 
resistance? Maybe true, but you still have created a hybrid parasite. 
  
Response. This is true. We have added a sentence to include this concern. 
  
Comment. Under “Option 1: snail culture facilities, potential ecological harm” page 5, first 
paragraph, line 4 should be corrected to read “access to the laboratory should be 
controlled…” 
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James E. Meiring   
1 Malawi-Liverpool Wellcome Trust Clinical Research Programme, Blantyre, Malawi 
2 Oxford Vaccine Group, Oxford University, Oxford, UK 
This is a well written, and referenced letter outlining the risk assessments for setting up CHI-S in 
Uganda. The authors should be commended for a very thorough approach to the topic, 
highlighting all areas of risk, from shipment and storage of infectious diseases and animal hosts 
through to the community-based responses to CHI-S and possible impact on other research 
activity. 
 
In addition to what is presented here, I think it might be helpful for the authors to outline their 
thinking on expectations for financial reimbursement for participants who go through the trial in 
Uganda, and if there are any risks attached to this, as discussed in Gordon, S et al. 2018 published 
in Wellcome Open Research1. 
 
It may also be beneficial to consult the literature for other examples of CHI studies that have been 
moved from non-endemic, high income countries to endemic sites. Although the individual risks 
may be different, the general lessons may be applicable and helpful. 
 
References 
1. Gordon SB, Chinula L, Chilima B, Mwapasa V, et al.: A Malawi guideline for research study 
participant remuneration.Wellcome Open Res. 2018; 3: 141 PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text  
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Competing Interests: No competing interests were disclosed.
Reviewer Expertise: Typhoid Fever epidemiology and vaccine trials. I was a clinical research fellow 
in CHI for typhoid in Oxford, UK, with clinical responsibility for patients, and am currently study 
clinician and co-PI for a typhoid vaccine trial in Blantyre, Malawi.
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of 
expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
Author Response 05 Aug 2019
Alison Elliott, Medical Research Council/Uganda Virus Research Institute and London 
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Uganda Research Unit, Entebbe, Uganda 
Comment: In addition to what is presented here, I think it might be helpful for the authors 
to outline their thinking on expectations for financial reimbursement for participants who 
go through the trial in Uganda, and if there are any risks attached to this, as discussed in 
Gordon, S et al. 2018 published in Wellcome Open Research. 
Response: We agree that the financial reimbursement is an important topic for debate. We 
have thus added a paragraph on this matter and included it in the table with risks related to 
the controlled human infection with Sm. 
  
Comment: It may also be beneficial to consult the literature for other examples of CHI 
studies that have been moved from non-endemic, high income countries to endemic sites. 
Although the individual risks may be different, the general lessons may be applicable and 
helpful. 
Response: We agree that it will be essential to interact with experienced researchers who 
have implemented CHI studies in LMIC. We added reference to this important topic by 
addressing a paper on the first malaria CHI in Kenya that describes issues that are also 
applicable for our CHI-S.  
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